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Privacy and the News Media
Stephen Cooper1
The right of the public to know and the right of the individual to be let alone are inherently in conflict.
The origins of these rights are quite different: the former derived from the First Amendment’s protection
of a free press, the latter in a law journal article published in the late nineteenth century. So, too, has the
development of these ideas followed different paths: the former as Constitutional law, the latter as tort
law. His article examines the relationship between privacy law and the press. A century ago two lawyers
called for legal relief from aggressive newspaper reporters. At the present time, the development of
electronic media, and struggles over group identities have given privacy concerns a new life and new
urgency.

It has been a little more than a hundred years since Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis
(1890) published an essay titled "The Right To Privacy" in the Harvard Law Review. The story
of the privacy tort weaves together social, economic, political, and technical forces in our
society. We might mark the milestones in our idea of privacy in this way:
-from a fact of frontier life in the early United States,
-to an endangered luxury of urban culture,
-to the advocacy of two young Boston lawyers,
-to the gradual common law recognition of tort actions,
-to the Supreme Court's elevation of the idea to Constitutional status,
-to privacy's continuing evolution in response to social changes and
electronic media.
By the present time our legal idea of privacy has broadened so far as to include sexual
practices and family planning. This paper restricts its focus to the relationship of privacy and the
news media. There is still a lot of ground to travel in the plot originally surveyed by Warren and
Brandeis in 1890.
Historical and Cultural Antecedents
The complexities of privacy are for the most part our modern or postmodern inventions.
Geographic or spatial isolation long served as both the enforcer, when desired, and cause of
privacy. Earlier times offered ready access to seclusion in the form of physical isolation from
fellow humans. While the idea of privacy as individual autonomy has taken some time to evolve
in European political and religious institutions, privacy as solitude was simply a part of ordinary
life (Hixson, 1987).
The nineteenth century expansion of urban centers changed the nature of privacy. Physical
isolation was not as easy to come by in the cities as in the countryside; domiciles were close
together and the sources of possible intrusion, intentional or inadvertent, greater in number.
Solitude, a given in rural America, was a luxury in the city. The decrease in physical space
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accompanied, and likely helped cause, a lack of "information privacy"; the rise of the Penny

Press and the popularization of the news ushered in the prying newspaper reporter (DickenGarcia, 1989, p. 198 ff.).
While in Colonial America the house had been the place where family members came
together and thus shared intimacy (Hixson, 1987), the home in Industrial America became a
barrier against the inhospitable outside world, and the sanctuary of a person's privacy. No longer
a readily available state of being, privacy became linked to the home as a territorial object
(Levine, 1980).
Warren and Brandeis saw invasive print journalists, "overstepping in every direction the
obvious bounds of propriety and of decency" (1890, p. 196), as a social problem requiring
response. The journalistic excesses of the time called for legal protection of individual citizens.
It is an interesting footnote that there is evidence to show that it was the reach of the press
into social affairs in private homes that prompted Warren and Brandeis (Hixson, 1987; Pember,
1972). While the passage of time has given their article something of a patina of egalitarianism,
Pember notes caustically that it was "essentially a rich man's plea to the press to stop its
gossiping and snooping, not an argument for an improvement of general journalistic standards" (
1972, p. 23).
The Origin of the Tort of Privacy
The tort of privacy is the response of our legal system, over time, to the Warren and Brandeis
essay, "The Right To Privacy" (1890). Just as common Jaw adapted in the past to other social
changes, Warren and Brandeis advocated a recognized right of privacy, necessitated by contemporary changes in social attitudes, journalistic practices, and in communication technology.
Over time the common law gradually broadened its protection against harm to persons and to
tangible property, extending finally to intellectual property, the "products and processes of the
mind" (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 194). The idea of a right to life broadened from simple
protection against battery, to freedom from undue restraint, to "the right to enjoy life,--the right
to be let alone" (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 193). Along this path was recognition that the law
should protect not just the material aspects of life, but also the emotional, spiritual, and philosophical. As society became more complex, so did the individual's need for retreat and solitude
grow greater.
Warren and Brandeis saw developments in photography and journalism as menacing this
enjoyment of life. Both in the acquisition of information and the publication of information, new
technology and journalistic practices had created a pressing need for a tort of privacy.
Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred
precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten
to make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be
proclaimed from the house-tops.' (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 195)
The contemporary press was out of control, they thought, and exploiting a weakness of the
common law for its own commercial gain. To them there was no doubt the public needed
protection, and no possibility the press would reform itself: "Gossip is no longer the resource of
the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as
effrontery" (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 196). Nor was the danger just to individuals, but to the
culture itself: "No enthusiasm can flourish, no generous impulse can survive under its blighting

influence" (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 196).
If, then, there was a pressing social need for legal protection of the individual's privacy, was
there an existing principle which could support this protection? Because the intrusion was
mediated (i.e., published) there was a resemblance to defamation (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p.
197), but this would require proof of material damages to be actionable, and Warren and
Brandeis recognized they were effectively arguing for injury to feelings. Rather, they linked their
privacy right to intellectual property rights: "the legal doctrines relating to…the common-law
right to intellectual and artistic property are, it is believed, but instances and applications of a
general right to privacy" (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 198).
The thread of their argument is this: "The common law secures to each individual the right of
determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others" (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 198). There are strict limits on the degree to
which this communication can be forced, even in criminal trials. This right is independent of the
medium or form of the expression, and ceases only when the individual chooses to make the
expression public (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 199).
Although the courts were at the time in the habit of describing this right as a property right,
often invoking breach of contract (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, pp. 207-211), some cases had
supported the right even when there was no significant monetary value (Warren & Brandeis,
1890, pp. 201-204). These, Warren and Brandeis held, were in fact examples "of the enforcement
of the more general right of the individual to be let alone" (1890, p. 205). The underlying legal
principle, therefore, was in reality "that of an inviolate personality" (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p.
205).
Warren and Brandeis realized that their privacy tort was conceptually in conflict with the
public's access to information. They exempted several classes of information from protection:
material of public interest (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 214), about voluntary public figures
(Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 215), on the public record (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 216), oral
(rather than printed) speech (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 217), and when there is consent to
publication (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 218). For the most part these protected categories
were recognized by the courts as the privacy tort developed in the twentieth century.
Development of the Right of Privacy
The privacy tort took hold slowly in case law. There was no specific U.S. Supreme Court
action until 1967, but a large number of cases were heard in state courts, gradually developing
the tort. Most states have by now recognized privacy as common law. Although Warren and
Brandeis asserted that sufficient legal precedent existed in 1890 for a tort of privacy, they nonetheless expressed a desire for criminal penalties (1890, p. 219). Relatively few states, however,
have enacted legislation compared to the large number of privacy cases decided at the state level.
Scholarly recognition came in 1960 with Prosser's description of four distinct privacy torts:
public disclosure of private facts, appropriation of likeness, intrusion, and false light in the public
eye (Prosser, 1960). Recently, Smolla has suggested two more privacy torts the courts may
recognize in the future: intentional infliction of emotional distress, and accumulation of public
facts (Smolla, 1992, p. 122).
The list of privacy cases is long, and a paper of this scope cannot be complete in its examination, or even its enumeration, of the cases. The following section notes cases and legislation

important to the development of the privacy tort, and identifies the major principles of the tort.
Many cases were heard in New York, as that state passed the country's first meaningful privacy
statute.
Significant Cases, and Their Legal Principles
Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co. (Pember, 1972, p. 61 ff.) is the first privacy suit decided in a
federal court. The First United States Circuit Court in Massachusetts denied on appeal in 1894 a
request to restrain publication of a biography of a deceased inventor. Even while noting that the
man should properly be considered a public figure, the decision rested on the principle that a
right to privacy could not interfere with the free press.
Schuyler v. Curtis (Pember, 1972, p. 59), an 1895 case in New York, concerned a proposed
exhibit commemorating a deceased philanthropist The Schuyler family sought to restrain the
exhibit and won in lower court. On appeal, the verdict was reversed on the grounds that an
individual's right of privacy dies with the individual.
In 1902 the New York Court of Appeals, in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. (Pember,
1972, p. 64 ff.), denied plaintiff Abigail Roberson relief against a manufacturer which had used
her likeness on advertising posters without obtaining permission. The court found that in New
York a legal right to privacy did not exist, and therefore no recovery was possible. Public outcry
at the perceived injustice of the decision prompted the New York legislature to pass the country's
first workable privacy law in 1903. This law was restricted in scope to appropriation of an
individual's likeness for commercial purposes.
The first nonstatutory approval of a right to privacy came from the Georgia Supreme Court in
1905 (Hixson, 1987, p. 40 ff.; Pember, 1972, p. 70 ff.). In the case of Pavesich v. New England
Mutual Life Insurance Co., the court granted recovery to artist Paolo Pavesich, whose picture
had been used without consent in a newspaper advertisement. Unlike the decision in Roberson,
the Georgia court held that freedom of the press did not bar a right to privacy, and drew a
distinction between free expression of ideas and commercial speech.
Defending against a privacy suit by arguing the newsworthiness of the information traces to
two cases in the New York Supreme Court, Moser v. Press Publishing Co. in 1908 and Jeffries v.
New York Evening Journal Publishing Co. in 1910 (Pember, 1972, p. 68 ff.). In both cases the
plaintiffs argued that using their pictures and names in published news stories constituted a trade
purpose since the newspapers were for sale, and thus violated New York's privacy statute. Both
cases were denied on the basis that granting damages would make it virtually impossible for the
press to bring accounts of daily news to the public.
The boundaries of newsworthiness were further explored in Binns v. Vitagraph Co., decided
by the New York Court of Appeals in 1911 (Pember, 1972, pp. 84-85). The plaintiff, a hero in an
actual steamship collision, objected to a motion picture reenactment of the incident which used
his real name. In this case the court found the fictionalized account of the news story to
constitute a trade purpose, and was thus actionable as a violation of privacy.
Could an individual lose the right to privacy involuntarily, by being involved in a newsworthy
event? The Kentucky Supreme Court established the involuntary public figure rule in the 1929
case of Jones v. Herald Post Co. (Pember, 1972, p. 89 ff.). The plaintiff had been quoted and
photographed in a news story of a killing, and argued that since she was not a public figure the
newspaper should have obtained her consent before publication. This decision established that a
private person may unwillingly become a public figure by being involved in an event of public

interest, and thereby lose some of the right to privacy. The involuntary public figure question
would again come up in the 1984 California case of Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (Lance,
1980, pp. 91-92, 106-107; Smolla, 1992, pp. 130-132).
Further clarification of what constitutes a trade purpose came in the 1937 New York Supreme
Court case of Sarat Lahiri v. Daily Mirror (Pember, 1972, p. 111 ff.) In denying the plaintiff
recovery for the newspaper's use of his photograph in an article debunking the "rope trick," the
court held the use of the photograph to be news, not a trade purpose. The decision described four
rules: a photograph used in an advertisement was actionable, a photograph accompanying fiction
was actionable, a photograph connected to news was not actionable, and a photograph connected
to a non-fiction article of general interest was not actionable.
The mores test emerged in the 1931 California Court of Appeals case of Melvin v. Reid
(Freedman, 1987 p. 49; Pember, 1972, p. 96 ff.; Prosser, 1960, pp. 392-393, 396-397). The
plaintiff, a reformed prostitute once tried for murder, sought damages for the use of her actual
maiden name in a movie based on her life story. While the decision held the events of her life to
be public information, relief was granted for two reasons: the plaintiffs name was used, and the
purpose of the movie was profit and not to provide the public with useful information. In large
measure the decision seemed to be based on sympathy for an individual who had reformed a less
than virtuous life, and then been drawn back into the public eye for a crass commercial purpose.
On the other hand, when a person had at one time voluntarily been a public figure, could that
individual recover the status of private citizen by deliberately trying to avoid the public eye for a
period of time? William James Sidis, a former child prodigy and mathematical genius, sued the
New Yorker magazine for publishing an article about his adult life as an obscure clerk (Freedman, 1987, pp. 46-47; Hixson, 1987, p. 43 ff.; Pember, 1972, p. 118 ff.; Prosser, 1960, p. 397).
In Sid is v. F-R Publishing Corp., decided in 1940, the Second United States Circuit Court
denied recovery, holding that public interest in Sidis' life overrode his own desire for seclusion.
In contrast to Melvin v. Reid, the published information about Sidis was not considered offensive
to community mores, and hence Melvin could recover but Sidis could not.
The question of whether coverage of an event of public interest constitutes a trade purpose
came up again in the 1952 case of Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., this time concerning broadcast
television (Pember, 1972, p. 180 ff.). The plaintiff, an animal trainer who performed during the
half time activities of a televised football game, argued that the presence of commercial
messages showed the broadcast to be a trade purpose. The New York Court of Appeals denied
recovery finding that television, just as print, is free to distribute information of public interest
despite the inclusion of advertising material.
Television docudramas were first considered in the 1955 case of Bernstein v. NBC (Pember,
1972, p. 182 ff.). The Washington DC Federal District Court denied recovery to the plaintiff,
whose troubles with the law were the subject of a fictionalized television program. Since the
plaintiffs real name was not used in the program and the court judged that the circumstances of
the case were still of public interest, the plaintiffs right to privacy was not violated. Subsequent
cases reinforced the liability of using, and the wisdom of avoiding, an individual's real name in
fictionalized stories.
The United State Supreme Court ruled on a privacy suit for the first time in the 1967 case of
Time. Inc. v. James J. Hill (Hixson, 1989, p. 495 ff.; Pember, 1972, p. 210 ff.). The Court overturned an award to Hill, who had sued following a Life magazine article about a Broadway play
based on an incident in which the Hill family had been held hostage. This decision applied the
actual malice test of libel, knowing falsity or reckless disregard for truth, to the false light

privacy tort. The 1974 Supreme Court case of Margaret Mae Cantrell et al. v. Forest City
Publishing Co. et al. (Hixson, 1989, p. 498 ff.) followed this test, in that case finding actual
malice on the part of the newspaper.
The Supreme Court affirmed another limitation on the privacy tort in Cox Broadcasting Corp.
et al. v. Martin Cohn, decided in 1975 (Freedman, 1987, p. 54; Hixson, 1989, p. 500 ff.). In this
case the Court reversed a judgment against a television station for broadcasting the name of a
rape victim, noting that the information was part of the public record. This decision established a
higher priority for the fact of the material's inclusion in public records than for the mores test of
the offensive quality of the information published.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of access to information in government databases in
United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (1989). In
this case the FBI had denied a reporter's request under the 1966 Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) for access to the "rap sheet" on Charles Medico. The Court held that disclosure of this
information would constitute an invasion of the individual's privacy, noting that the purpose of
the FOIA was to allow public access to information about the activities of government agencies,
not to data the agencies had accumulated about private citizens.
More recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that the presence of a
television crew during a Secret Service raid of an apartment was illegal, and allowed recovery to
the residents of the apartment (Sullivan, 1994). Although an agent had invited the crew along to
tape for the CBS reality show, Street Stories, the court held this to be a violation of the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure: "Video pictures taken by
camera crew constituted a 'seizure' under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment" (Ayeni v. CBS
Inc., 1994, p. 363). Further, the court found the videotaping to be a trade purpose, rather than
protected newsgathering: "The television crew was present only for proprietary reasons -- i.e.,
potential profit to the television broadcaster" (Ayeni v. CBS Inc., 1994, p. 364).
Privacy Today, Privacy Tomorrow
In 1960 William Prosser cited a comment that the privacy tort was as orderly as a "haystack
in a hurricane" (1960, p. 407). Perhaps since then we have clarified the situation to the level of a
nor'easter. By now the right of privacy has undergone considerable development: there is now a
considerable body of case law, a few statutes, a number of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, and a
piece of federal legislation. Still, the conflict of the individual's right to be let alone and the
public's right to know is often heated, and technological development relentlessly pushes the
law's ability to adequately respond to contemporary media practices and public concerns
(Brenner & Rivers, 1982). In one sense it has been a long journey since the Warren and Brandeis
article in 1890; in another, we really have not gone anywhere at all. Prosser (1960, p. 410)
describes the privacy tort as the "slow evolution of a compromise" between the Constitutional
guarantee of a free press and the common law right to hold the press at bay.
One change is the way we conceive of privacy. In earlier and simpler times privacy was
solitude (Hixson, 1987), a consequence of physical isolation. To be private was the natural state,
and people sought community with others rather than having it thrust upon them. With the
industrial revolution came urbanization, and the loss of physical space. It is not surprising that
curiosity about one's fellows grew, nor that the press would fill the demand for information. By
the time Warren and Brandeis proposed a legal right to privacy, the desire was for protection
from intrusion.

The "right to one's personality" (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 207), for instance, underlies the
tort of appropriation via Pavesich and the New York privacy statute via Roberson. Courts were
understandably reluctant to move hastily to a general notion of privacy, but instead extended
cautiously the idea of property interests into new ground, that of personality. New York in
Roberson found the freedom to publish to have absolute priority, and thereby sparked the outcry
for protective legislation. Georgia in Pavesich drew a distinction between commercial speech
and expression of ideas.
So, too, did the limitations of the right to privacy develop along the lines acknowledged by
Warren and Brandeis. Publication of information about public figures, of public interest,
voluntarily released by private individuals, or on the public record is protected. For example,
Cox Broadcasting established that the press may publish facts on the public record, even when
the information is offensive. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has given the press more
latitude than Warren and Brandeis seem to have wanted. While they had hoped to keep the
defenses against a privacy suit distinct from the defenses against libel, Time v. Hill borrowed the
actual malice test from the libel case of New York Times v. Sullivan (Hixson, 1989, pp. 337-339),
putting a greater burden of proof on the plaintiff.
Predictably, issues have arisen that Warren and Brandeis did not foresee, and likely could not
have foreseen. Without the involuntary public figure rule stated in Jones v. Herald Post Co.
much newsgathering would simply be impossible. Consequently the question arose how a person
might regain private citizen status, having once been a public figure. The Melvin and Sidis cases
gave a complex answer. Time out of the public eye is not sufficient in itself to erase the exposure
to scrutiny, or else William James Sidis would have been allowed recovery. Nonetheless, the
privilege of publication is not limitless and forever, and Gabrielle Darley Melvin was granted
damages given the distasteful (i.e., offensive to contemporary mores) nature of the information
about her.
Fictionalization is another issue that might have been difficult to anticipate. In Bernstein and
Binns the courts laid down the cardinal rule for creative use of news stories: do not identify if
you alter the story. Fictionalized accounts of news stories, unlike hard news, do indeed constitute
trade purposes and are thus less privileged than news; privacy is protected, and liability avoided,
by concealing the identities of the people depicted.
Some have expressed concern that the courts have enlarged the scope of the privacy torts too
much. Prosser (1960, p. 422) worried that the public disclosure and false light torts have encroached on the area of defamation, but without the "defenses, limitations and safeguards established for the protection of the defendant." The mores test was of particular concern: "the courts,
although cautiously and reluctantly, have accepted a power of censorship over what the public
may be permitted to read…" (Prosser, 1960, p. 423). Prosser might also have been troubled how
readily the U.S. Supreme Court expanded the "penumbra" of privacy into apparently unrelated
areas, despite the absence of specific Constitutional reference, in Griswold v. Connecticut, Katz
v. U.S., and Roe v. Wade (Hixson, 1989, p. 510 ff.). Perhaps the actual malice test adopted in
Time, Inc. v. Hill would reassure him that balance was being restored. On the other hand, the
current popularity of tabloid television shows would likely revive the original raison d'etre of the
privacy torts.
Now, as information is increasingly an electronic commodity, and ever freer of the physical
and temporal limitations which previously constrained newsgathering and publication, we are
coming to think of privacy as the ability to control information about ourselves (Richards, 1980,
p. 136). Electronic information is intrinsically different from earlier media: easier to disseminate,

easier to store and recall, easier to collate and analyze, easier to edit or reuse. Katsh notes that
"privacy is dependent on limiting the communication of information and keeping some information separate from other information" (1989, p. 196). Unlike the prying and snooping reporters
which so troubled Warren and Brandeis, much of the information collected today by electronic
means is revealed voluntarily, although the ultimate receivers of the information are no longer
controlled by the individual. The problem may now be more one of encroachment than invasion.
More than a decade ago Levine warned of the danger of "a complex social system which
needs information to survive and which is forever expanding the scope and intimacy of data
regarded as relevant" (1980, p. 20). The threat is no longer potential, but actual. Piller (1993, p.
127-128) was able to quickly and inexpensively construct profiles of 18 prominent California
residents, including "essential financial, legal, marital, and residential histories" (Piller, 1993, p.
128), using only online searches of commercial and government sources, and only legally
accessible data.
In many states, motor vehicle agency records can be a rich source of personal data in addition
to driving records. In some states, names and addresses are available to match license plate
numbers (Hernandez, 1994, p. 19); state laws controlling information in motor vehicle records
vary widely (Prime, 1994, p. 40). Journalists have responded to privacy advocates· demands that
access to the records be closed, by proposing an "opt-out" option similar to unlisted phone
numbers (Hernandez, 1994; Prime, 1994). Marketing firms already make extensive use of transaction generated data, information about consumer interests and preferences created by credit
card and "frequent shopper" card purchases (Healey, 1994 ). Electronic communications and
transactions, in which we engage voluntarily, have a capability to generate information about
ourselves with which we are not always comfortable, as the debate over caller ID blocking
demonstrates (Mitchell & DeCew, 1994; Wald, 1994; Wald 1995).
We can expect such electronic profiles to become easier and less expensive to compile, in
absence of legal restrictions. A likely byproduct of greater user-friendliness in computer technology is erosion of the gatekeeper's role: more people will be able to access more data on their
own. A likely byproduct of market competition among database services is lower pricing: the
financial commitment to such inquiry will be smaller. A likely byproduct of networking is
greater convenience: records that had formerly been scattered across many discrete databases
will be pooled. The richness of electronic data sources has not escaped the notice of journalists
(see, for instance, Abernathy, 1993 ). As Sussman ( 1993, p. 70) comments, "the phenomenal
increase in the power and connectivity of computers is rapidly eroding whatever de facto
protection may have existed."
In response to the proliferation of databases Smolla proposes a new tort of accumulation of
public facts (1992, pp. 149-150). While it might be that no one item of data is private, the totality
of the information in the database forms "a composite picture of a person's life in which the
offensiveness of the whole is worse than the sum of the parts" (Smolla, 1992, p. 149). In plain
language, we do not want anyone to know everything about us, even if we have nothing in
particular to hide.
We might see this increase in the fluidity of information as the final stage in the devolution of
physical space as a safeguard of privacy. When people had greater physical space in which to
live, seclusion provided privacy. When news was disseminated via print and gathered by face-toface reportage, information could still be contained by physical restrictions. Electronic data can
be accessed from virtually anywhere, quickly transported virtually anywhere, and are difficult in
practice to secure against intrusion.

Electronic media seem to be affecting our social roles themselves. Meyrowitz (1985) has
described how electronic media have broken down the integrity of traditionally private areas.
The "backstage" regions are increasingly open to public view; public figures adapt by cultivating
a "sidestage" or middle region persona, less formal than the traditional "onstage" presence. The
public has lately come to expect a less official and more personal view, even of the chief
executive of the federal government.
As an example, consider whether today's White House press corps would be willing to keep
the secret of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's paralysis. Consider also whether FDR would have
appeared in public revealing an abdominal scar, as did Lyndon Johnson, or playing a saxophone,
as did Bill Clinton. It may be that public figures will have to endure ever more revealing or
embarrassing disclosures. One might question whether information about Judge Kimba Wood's
brief stint as a cocktail waitress trainee was relevant to her nomination as Attorney General, yet
it became part of public discourse thanks to news reportage (Berke, 1993).
This erosion of privacy may well be due to the ease with which electronic information can
transcend limitations of space and time, including limitations on searching prior texts and
records. The electronic media break down spatial and temporal barriers that traditionally
facilitated the maintenance of private areas of life. At the very least, if we cannot prove causality,
we are forced to notice the coincidence of electronic news and the penetration of the public eye
into formerly private regions.
There is other evidence that our culture is tending toward more disclosure and less privacy.
When news reporters tape their "standups" outdoors, there will often be a number of passers-by
vying to get into the shot (Powers, 1980). What a difference from the picture Warren and
Brandeis painted of the press hounding reluctant citizens! As Rosenblatt comments, "privacy in
our time has not only been invaded; it's been eagerly surrendered" (1993, p. 24). Guests on
confessional television shows such as Phil Donahue's and Oprah Winfrey's routinely disclose
information that not long ago would have been considered intimate, and most do so with relish.
Consider, too, that the disclosure is made not just to the audience of strangers in the television
studio, but to the completely anonymous audience of broadcast viewers. One study found that
some guests revealed information they themselves considered stigmatizing in the hope of
legitimating a social group to which they saw themselves belonging; "any hesitancy about
disclosure was outweighed by the perceived benefits to society and to the standing of one's
marginalized group" (Priest Dominick, 1994, p. 83). Clearly, these individuals used their
television appearances to communicate instrumentally, and were not at all invaded or harassed
by the press.
The crucial question, of course, is whether the willing self-disclosures of some members of
society ought to condition an expectation of universal renunciation of privacy. Do I have to tell
Oprah about my sexual habits because others want to disclose theirs? Voluntary disclosures,
while distasteful to many, are not violations of privacy rights. More troubling, though, is the
possibility that in the future it may not be my own choice to disclose or not disclose information
I consider to be personal. Taylor (1994), for instance, has questioned whether a legal system
based on individual rights can adequately serve the identity and political needs of minority
groups in a pluralistic society. Appiah makes the suggestion explicit: 'There can be legitimate
collective goals whose pursuit will require giving up pure proceduralism" (1994, p. 157).
The practice of "outing," publishing information about an individual's homosexuality without
his or her consent, provides a contemporary example. This type of journalism would seem a clear
case of the public disclosure of private facts tort described by Prosser (1960). The practice has

been defended on the grounds that public disclosure will over time legitimate homosexuality, and
thus the group benefit of outing can outweigh the privacy claims of the individual whose
sexuality is involuntarily placed in the public eye (Elwood, 1992, pp. 747-748). McCarthy, for
example, holds that "outing can sometimes be justified as a tactic for eliminating enemies,
destroying the closet, and asserting gay dignity" (1994, p. 28). At the very least, defenders of
outing argue that the right to privacy should not constitute an absolute prohibition against outing,
which must be considered on a case-by-case basis: "no general rule against outing can be
maintained since outing others may be defensible as one pursues one's own legitimate legal and
moral interests" (Chekola, 1994, p. 67). Critics of outing, on the other hand, maintain the
primacy of the individual's privacy interests.
When activists out a prominent figure to provide a positive example of
homosexual -- so-called "role model" outing -- information about his sexuality is
relevant only to the general, sociological issue of the role of gays in society. In
such cases, the privacy interest is at its apex while the interest in disclosure is at
its nadir (Elwood, 1992, p. 776).
Perhaps the crux of it is whether or when personal information should be deemed newsworthy. Newsworthiness is a classic defense against a privacy suit, but what qualities cause
information to become newsworthy in a legal sense? Pember cites three factors: public interest,
public figure, public record. "Broadly speaking, when the topic under discussion is of legitimate
public interest, or when the subject is a voluntary or involuntary public figure, or when the facts
of the story have been taken from the public record" there will be no recovery (1972, p. 162).
But who then should have the power to determine what matters are of public interest? If the
press is indeed a crucial supplier to a marketplace of ideas in which truth emerges from competition (Emord, 1991, pp. 121-122), we are led to giving the press the latitude to delineate public
interest; that "whatever is in the news media is by definition newsworthy, that the press must in
the nature of things be the final arbiter of newsworthiness" (Kalven, 1982, p. 89). Prosser says
that in fact this is the case: "to a very great extent the press, with its experience or instinct as to
what its readers will want, bas succeeded in making its own definition of news" (1960, p. 412).
Smolla, too, holds that we must "[defer] to the press's own judgment on the issue" (1992, p. 133),
and when there is a conflict between a privacy interest and news interest, "newsworthiness
always wins, whether the plaintiff is a public figure or a private figure" (Smolla, 1992, p. 127).
Despite some recent decisions against a television show's taping of police raids (Viles, 1994), it
would seem the absolutism of Sidis has for the most part carried the day over the kinder, gentler
mores test of Melvin. Even though Cox Broadcasting affirmed "a zone of privacy surrounding
every individual" (cited in Emerson, 1982, p. 99), public scrutiny nonetheless enjoys the benefit
of the doubt.
One Last Word…
The free press serves a vital public need, and hence enjoys special protection, under the First
Amendment, not provided any other business (Stewart, 1982). The conflict between the public's
right to know and the individual's right to be protected from undue public scrutiny cannot be
resolved, but only balanced. Much of the difficulty comes from the changes in our expectations
of privacy (Emerson, 1982, p. 114).

In a sense, the 1966 Freedom Of Information Act and the 1974 Privacy Act typify our desire
to both know everything about everybody yet retain our own mystery. Privacy law is pressured
by information technology and the journalism market. An analogous situation existed in the late
nineteenth century, and Warren and Brandeis framed the problem well: "recent inventions and
business methods call attention to the next step which must be taken for the protection of the
person" (1890, p. 195).
What Warren and Brandeis could not have foreseen was the late twentieth century elevation
of group identity and group rights, and the resulting retrenchment of personal privacy in situations involving the press. While our privacy law has thus far proved adaptable when stressed by
changes in information technology, the challenge posed by the politics of recognition (Taylor,
1994) is far more radical. At bottom, the privacy tort is a recognition of a special kind of
property right, that of one's own personality. If we choose to subordinate the individual's privacy
right to the group's collective need to legitimize its social identity, we undermine the very
rationale for privacy, and indeed the only means of its survival in an electronic age.
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